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International migration is a conspicuous manifestation of contemporary globalization.
1 As a result of improved and strengthened transborder interconnections, the numbers of migrants are growing at an accelerated pace and now comprise around 200 million people. Migratory movements have also expanded geographically so that all states and regions in the world are now affected at some point of the migratory chain -as destination, sending, or transit regions.
In other issue-areas that involve movement across borders -such as trade, climate change, or contagious diseases -states have developed institutionalized forms for cooperation in order to meet these challenges more efficiently. But this has not been the case for international migration, which is usually characterized by the absence of multilateral institutional frameworks (Bhagwati, 2003; Ghosh, 2007) . 2 However, the past few years have seen the evolvement of bottom-up structures for global migration governance (Betts, 2008: 1) . A wide array of organizations and forums for consultation and dialogue are now handling various aspects of migration. The complex system of institutions that are emerging at the bilateral, regional, and global levels are distinguished by the continual central role of the state, while other actors enjoy very limited access. In fact, as the term "global" in the context of governance is usually meant to signify the increased influence of transnational actors (Lipschutz, 1996: 1; Pattberg, 2006: 4) , it has been suggested that the governance of migration should more appropriately be described as "international" -given that states are still unquestionably the paramount actors (Channac, 2007) . In contrast to most other chapters of this volume, this one therefore engages with a case which has so far not been marked by significant levels of participation by transnat tional actors (TNAs).
The general aim of this chapter is to contribute to the study of global migration governance, an area that has so far not been much studied within international relations. More specifically, it develops an analytical framework derived from rational choice institutionalism in order to explicate two interrelated features of the global governance of migration. First, it wants to explain the general traits of the institutions that we see emerging in the migration field. Second, it wants to explain the level of transnational access to these institutions. In the case of migration, it is not possible to understand the low level of transnational access, unless one also understands the nature of the institutions that states have created in this area. The specific character of global migration governance therefore necessitates a certain broadening of the focus for this volume.
Empirically, this chapter pays specific attention to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). The GFMD first convened in 2007, notably the first recurrent forum for migration cooperation at the global level. The major patterns of global migration governance are briefly introduced in order to contextualize the GFMD. The empirical material used consists of secondary sources as well as material produced by the relevant institutions.
The chapter is structured around the two different aims. The first section summarizes the expectations of rational choice institutionalism as regards institutional variation. This is followed by a section testing these expectations in the case of migration governance. The third section turns to the subject of transnational access, by outlining the expectations of rational choice institutionalism. The fourth section assesses the strength of these expectations in the case of migration governance. In the final section, the findings are summarized and the strengths and weaknesses of the analytical framework are discussed.
Explaining variation in institutional design
Rational choice institutionalism differs significantly from other institutional theory perspectives, which are as a rule distinguished by their focus on how institutions shape and constrain the behavior of actors. The rational choice variant, in contrast, turns causality the other way around -conceiving of institutions as intentionally shaped by agents (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 569) . In international relations, the main agents are states, which are assumed to act strategically and in accordance with
